

A Break from The Past: Trends in Pakistan's Security Policy After 9/11

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Acronyms

FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Agencies
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ISPR	Inter Services Public Relations
JUI	Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LJ	Lashkar-i-Jhangvi
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SSP	Sipah-I-Sahaba Pakistan
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction

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Shabana Fayyaz* | August 2005

Abstract

Pakistan's decision to ally itself with the United States in its post-9/11 'war on terrorism' signified a major shift in its security policy. This transition is ongoing as Islamabad addresses and re-thinks the threat of religious extremism, nuclear proliferation, the Kashmir dispute and composite dialogue with New Delhi, and the future of post-Taliban Afghanistan. Together with a vulnerable economy, the Musharraf government finds itself walking a tightrope as it tries to balance an increasingly challenging and interlinked set of external and internal security dynamics.

1 | Introduction

There is no external threat which can do any harm to us. We are capable of handling any external threat. The enemy lies within and this element of religious and sectarianism may pull us down.¹

Increasingly, our image is being shaped by the extremist actions of a tiny minority that exists on the fringes of Muslim societies... We must not allow them to hijack our religion, to preach religious and sectarian hatred with impunity, and to tarnish the image of Islam and Muslims. We must reclaim our Faith from these usurpers and project the real moderate and tolerant spirit of Islam to the world.²

Pakistan is today facing four dangerous allegations.... We are being held responsible for giving rise to terrorism in Afghanistan from our

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¹ "President Musharraf's Speech", October 4, 2003. Quoted in: "Changing Global and Geo-Strategic Environment: Implications for Pakistan", *Margalla Papers 2004*, (Islamabad: National Defense College, 2004).

² "President Musharraf's Speech at the OIC Summit, October 16, 2003", Ibid.

tribal areas, alleged for terrorism along the Line of Control in Kashmir, alleged for nuclear proliferation, and our society is being perceived as intolerant and pro-extremism.³

The above-cited words of Pakistan's President General Pervez Musharraf clearly signify the critical security realization⁴ felt by Islamabad in the wake of the attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001 (henceforth referred to as 9/11) and the ongoing 'war on terrorism'. The policies and measures adopted thereafter spring from the fact that there exists a deep and delicate nexus between the internal and external security imperatives of Pakistan. A 'strong defense', 'progressive and moderate state', and 'strong economy' are contemporary catch phrases of Islamabad's security practitioners and thinkers alike. How to materialize these aspirations is a long-term process and will require sustained effort both at the policy making and policy practice level.

This paper discusses the major trends in Pakistan's security policy in the wake of its decision to ally itself with the United States as a 'front line ally' in the global war on terrorism that began with the strikes on Taliban-ruled Afghanistan, in October 2001. This campaign has entered its second phase, as Taliban supporters and members of Al Qaeda have found safe havens in the rugged Pakistan-Afghanistan border region inhabited by ethnic Pashtuns. The Pakistan army has used a range of military and political tactics to attack these 'foreign militants' (from FATA – Federally Administered Tribal Agencies), and the process continues.⁵ The policy being pursued by the government can be described as a 'carrot and stick' approach: a combination of military operations, political pressure, a 'policy of amnesty'⁶, economic sanctions and the initiation of development projects⁷ relating to building infrastructure

³ "President Wants Jihad Against Extremism", *Dawn*, January 18, 2004.

⁴ Note: The term "Critical security realization" implies approaching the country's national security in a broader sense. That is, domestic economic and social stability to be an indispensable component of the national security framework – as a means to ensure peace and stability within and beyond.

⁵ FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan) consists of seven Tribal Agencies and six smaller Frontier Regions, strung along a slightly oblique north-south axis. FATA shares a border with Afghanistan, officially known as the Durand Line, that is porous in nature. The terrain, spread over an area of 27,000 square kilometers and home to three and a half million people, is primarily a semi-arid mountainous region. Article 1 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan treats FATA as a separate entity to be administered by the Federal Government as prescribed in Article 247 of the Constitution. Accordingly, FATA is outside the executive authority of the NWFP (North West Frontier Province) and the Governor, NWFP, in his capacity as an Agent to the President, regulates its affairs. No Act of Legislature extends to FATA unless approved by the President and the jurisdiction of the superior Courts is very limited in its applicability to the matters relating to the region. The Political Agent in an Agency and the Assistant Political Agent in a Frontier Region represent the Government and embody the executive writ of the Federation of Pakistan.

⁶ The Governor of NWFP acting as agent of the President of Pakistan, in December 2003, announced an amnesty for the foreigners who would surrender to the Government and not act or be involved in terrorist activities within Pakistan or across the border, can continue to live in the Agency as per *Riwaj* and tradition as *Hamsaya*. This was followed by the famous 'Shikai Agreement' in which major harbourers were given amnesty; following its failure in June 2004 a major military operation was launched in Shikai Valley. Similar agreements were also being made with the tribes in Wana.

⁷ "The Government has increased budgetary allocations for FATA from about 1 billion rupees in 2000-2001 to almost Rs. 6 billion for the current financial years. Donor Agencies contributed

(roads, bridges, communication networks) as well as educational, social, and political projects. To quote an Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) Director General Major Shaukat Sultan, “the government adopted both direct and indirect strategies to flush out militants from South Waziristan. When Tribal Jirgas, Lashkars, and other tactics failed then the government opted for military action.”⁸

The central argument here is that Pakistan’s decision to side with the US-led War on Terrorism began a new chapter in its security framework, blurring and meshing external and internal security dynamics.

The need to have an integrated and comprehensive assessment of its national security environment has become a challenge to the creativity of security policy makers and shapers alike. Pakistan has taken the road that, in Robert Frost’s words, is ‘less traveled’ – full of new turns and twists, calling for sustenance and steadfastness. Terrorism does not happen in vacuum and necessitates a solution that is concerted and comprehensive in its aims and means. Along with military tactics, reform at the structural level is essential. This in turn calls for a sustained effort to eradicate from the country a militarist mindset promoted by sectarian groups and Madrassas and replace it with a social order based on peaceful co-existence and mutual harmony.

This paper defines security as a holistic concept, embracing multi-sectored dimensions ranging from military, economic, religious, societal and so on. That is, “national security problem is a systemic enterprise, in which individual, state, and the system all play a part... Interaction between these levels explains the contradictions, giving more depth to the understanding of the security.”⁹ This holds true in case of Pakistan too.

The paper argues that Pakistan today is a state in transition, marked by divergences within and engaged in process of re-thinking the basic themes of security policies that it has pursued for a long time. The threat of religious extremism and terrorism facing Pakistan is multi-faceted in nature and scope and reflects perceptions about what constitutes a national interest held by the government and society. The religious right, particularly Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (JUI) controlled Madrassas along the Pak-Afghan border, that had long supported the Taliban regime in Kabul for ideological, political and economic reasons, became prime critics of Islamabad’s policy on terrorism. However, it is pertinent to note here that the strength of the pro-Taliban demonstrations in Pakistan on October 7, 2001, after the US military campaign did not exceed 240,000.¹⁰ This is a quite small figure in a country of a 140 million.

The central question the paper raises is: is there a change in Pakistan’s security strategy before and after the emergence of the US-led Global War on

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an additional sum of Rs. 1.78 billion for various projects”. This was stated by the Governor, NWFP, addressing a national seminar on “Tribal Areas of Pakistan: Challenges and Responses”, organized by IPRI, September 7, 2004, Islamabad.

⁸ Quoted in, *Dawn*, December 9, 2004.

⁹ Barry Buzan, *People, States, and Fear*, (London: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd, 1983).

¹⁰ This figure is quoted in Syed Rifaat Hussain, “War Against Terrorism: Pakistani Perspective”, *IPRI Journal*, Vol. IV, Number 1, Winter 2004, pp.30-47.

Terrorism, and how might this trend affect peace and stability in South Asia and globally? To probe this question, the paper is divided into two inter-related parts. The first part looks at why a shift occurred in Pakistan's security strategy from being pro-Taliban to pro-US and anti-Taliban. The second part charts the contours of this change or break – internally and externally – and looks into the challenges and constraints Pakistan faces in the process of walking a 'less traveled' road to peace within and beyond. In conclusion, certain policy recommendations are made as a pathway to sustain Pakistan's contemporary security overtures at the internal and external level.

2. | Part One: Why Pakistan joined the US-led Global War on Terrorism

There are number of perspectives through which to conceptualize the change registered in Pakistan's security framework following a u-turn from its earlier pro-Taliban policy to the current anti-terrorism posture. One plausible argument is that Pakistan's decision to break away from the Taliban was a product of internal, regional, and international calculations/understanding of the country's security milieu. President Musharraf publicly condemned Islamic extremism well before 9/11 and envisaged Pakistan as a moderate Muslim state that would resemble Turkey rather than Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. Addressing the religious leaders gathering on June 5, 2001, President Musharraf warned that, "... our conduct internally and externally had led the world to regard us as terrorists."¹¹ In the altered regional and international strategic calculus following 9/11, Pakistan's relations with the Taliban finally ended.

President Musharraf, in his nation wide televised address on September 19, 2001, said "... at this juncture I am worried about Pakistan only.... I give top priority to the defense of Pakistan. Defense of any other country comes later."¹² This clearly signaled Afghanistan as more of a strategic liability than an asset for Pakistan in the post-9/11 strategic milieu.

Following Pakistan's decision to join the international coalition against terrorism, Pakistan was successful in altering its earlier 'most sanctioned'¹³ status and 'internationally isolated, economically fragile'¹⁴ image. Such a state of affairs prior to 9/11 was a product of decades of mis-governance, failure to sustain democracy, non-investment in social and human development, militarization of civil society, and growth of sectarian and

¹¹ Quoted in Najmuddin A. Shaikh, "Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan's Foreign Policy in the Changed Global Environment", *Margalla Papers 2004*, (Islamabad: National Defense College, 2004), pp.1-12.

¹² "President General Pervez Musharraf Address to the Nation", September 19, 2001.

¹³ Note: Prior to 9/11, Pakistan was subjected to four types of US sanctions: President Bush (Senior), under Section 620-E of Foreign Assistance Act or Pressler Amendment, suspended economic assistance and military sales to Pakistan in October 1990. Following the nuclear tests by Pakistan in 1998, another set of military and economic sanctions was imposed on Pakistan under the Arms Export Control Act. After the military takeover of Pakistan by General Musharraf on October 12, 1999, the U.S. imposed another set of sanctions under the democracy law. In November 2000, the US imposed two-year sanctions on Pakistan's Ministry of Defense and Pakistan's Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Organization on receiving missile technology and equipment from China. In September 2001 sanctions were again imposed for another two years on some Pakistani companies on the same grounds. Following Islamabad's decision to join the US-led international campaign against terrorism, Pak-US relations have again registered a high point. On the sanctions front, U.S. President Bush in two separate orders on September 22, 2001, and on October 27, 2001 respectively, removed nuclear test related economic sanctions, democracy related sanctions on Pakistan and debt rescheduling through 2003. This removal of sanctions allowed Islamabad to receive \$600 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) from the USA. In 2002, Pakistan received an estimated \$624.5 million in development assistance and ESF.

¹⁴ Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair and Jamison Jo Medby, *Limited Conflict Under the Nuclear Umbrella*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), pp.ix – xii.

ethnic cleavages. To quote an eminent South Asian analyst, Stephan P. Cohen, on the eve of September 11, most observers saw India as “rising” and Pakistan “floundering”.¹⁵

Diplomatic isolation

By the end of the 1990s Pakistan had become isolated on the international front

By the end of the 1990s Pakistan had become isolated on the international front.¹⁶ Reasons for such a disagreeable situation are a flux of domestic, regional, and international factors. The US following the Soviet Union withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988 and the subsequent disintegration of the USSR in 1991, virtually lost interest in South Asia. To quote American South Asian analyst Rodney Jones:

Though Pakistan remained an important moderate Muslim country but India was perceived to have more cards and a better hand overall with its influence in the Middle East, Far East and a much larger role in international trade.¹⁷

Like wise Professor Stephen Cohen notes pre-9/11:

.... India was perceived in the United States as becoming stronger or making good progress in economic development, trade promotion and spread of democracy and was increasingly perceived as a favorable partner.¹⁸

As a result, Islamabad's geo-strategic value and partnership that Washington regarded as critical during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan dropped drastically. In October 1990 all the American aid to Pakistan was suspended and in 1993 Islamabad was pressed to 'roll back' its nuclear program. Islamabad's refusal to submit to this demand further strained the Pak-US relations.

Likewise, Pakistan's May 1998 nuclear weapons tests which followed those of India, prompted imposition of sanctions from the USA, Japan and the majority of other western lenders. They also suspended all loans to Pakistan totaling \$231 million in 1997, and cancelled grant aid of approximately \$55 million. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) credit and the parallel World Bank loan adjustment were also blocked following the U.S. and other shareholders coalition against Islamabad.¹⁹ To quote one analyst,

¹⁵ Quoted in Rizwan Zeb, “US interests in South Asia in post 9/11 Era: Effects on Pakistan”, *Margalla Papers 2004* (National Defense College, Islamabad, 2004), p.75.

¹⁶ Christophe Jaffrelot, ed, *A History of Pakistan And Its Origin*, (London: Anthem Press, 2002), p.264.

¹⁷ Rodney Jones, “United States and South Asia: Core Interests and Policies and their impact on the Security and Economic Development of the Regional Countries”, *Papers Read at the Institute of Regional Studies Seminar on Major Powers and South Asia*, held at Islamabad, August 11-13, 2003.

¹⁸ Stephen Cohen, *Ibid*.

¹⁹ *Ibid*.

These punitive international measures coupled with the bad economic decisions, such as freezing of all foreign currency accounts by the Nawaz Sharif government, contributed significantly to the crisis of international confidence in Pakistan and also resulted in the loss of vitally needed foreign exchange by the country.²⁰

Coupled with these developments, the worsening of Indo-Pak tensions that heightened the fears of a full-scale war between two sides on account of 1999 Kargil crisis, further tarnished Islamabad's image and deepened its diplomatic isolation. Most of the international community saw Islamabad as sabotaging the great "Lahore spirit" unleashed by Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee's "peace journey" to Pakistan in February 1999.²¹

Similarly, General Musharraf's military coup on October 12, 1999 also added to the country's diplomatic isolation: additional American sanctions were imposed and Pakistan was suspended from the ex-British Empire club, the Commonwealth. In effect, Islamabad had only two important allies left: China and Saudi Arabia.²² In addition, the negative costs and limits of its pro-Taliban Afghan policy became quite clear to the Musharraf regime well before 9/11. Islamabad's inability to persuade the Taliban not to destroy the pre-Islamic Bamiyan Buddhas, and failure to secure the handing over of the Lashkhar-i-Jhangvi trainees who were crossing the Durand Line to cause trouble in Pakistan, termed as a threat of 'Talibanization'²³, added to the urgency to rethink and revise its policy on the Taliban. The violence prone extreme groups such as Lashkar "were using Afghanistan as a sanctuary courtesy of the Taliban, who were known to be hospitable to their guests... And its leader Basra had developed a close working relationship with Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden."²⁴

Events after 9/11 proved to be the final seal on Pakistan giving up its already futile pro-Taliban posture

Parallel to these considerations, Islamabad faced sustained international diplomatic pressure to seek the Taliban's compliance with international demands for the closure of terrorist camps and handover of Osama bin Laden.²⁵ Thus, events after 9/11 proved to be the final seal on Pakistan giving up its already futile pro-Taliban posture. The impact of 9/11 on Pakistan's international affairs may be summed up in two trends: withdrawal from Afghanistan (to some extent from Kashmir); and a return to the international

²⁰ Ibid, p.38.

²¹ Syed Rifaat Hussain, "War against Terrorism: Pakistani Perspective", in Richard Bonney, ed, *Conference Proceedings: US-Pakistan Relations: Thwarting Global Terrorism*, (Leicester: University of Leicester, 2004), pp.233-262.

²² Christophe Jaffrelot, op.cit.

²³ Note: 'Talibanization' is used in this paper as a metaphor to describe a set of measures or maneuvers that were favored on both sides of the Pak-Afghan border by the Taliban regime in Kabul and religious right groups in North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) in Pakistan respectively. Talibanization is not simply an explanation of events in Afghanistan. It consists of the following perception: Hegemony of a majority Sunni (Deobandi) sect of Muslims as the basis of political unity and control in a multi-sectarian and ethnically diverse societies. A fundamentalist version of Islam as the basis of legitimacy in a nation that is overwhelmingly Muslim. Use of coercion and force is justified to eliminate dissent where Islam and ethnic dominance have failed to do so.

²⁴ Jessica Stern, *Terror in the Name God: Why Religious Militants Kill*, (New York: HarperCollins, 2003), p.341.

²⁵ Tim Judah, "The Taliban Papers", *Survival*, London, Vol. 44. No. 1 (Spring 2002), pp.69-80.

fold. Its impact within the country itself has been a clampdown on Islamists (how effective this is, not yet clear) and the consolidation of Musharraf's power base.²⁶

Threat of sectarianism

Between General Musharraf's coup on October 12, 1999 and August 2001, sectarian violence left 220 dead and 2,000 wounded.²⁷ Most of the incidents were between the Sunni organizations (Lashkar-i-Jhangvi – LJ, and Sipah-I-Sahaba Pakistan – SSP) and the Shia movement (Sipah-I-Mohammed). There was a clear and definite demand from the Pakistani government to act against religious extremism, and time and again it was reminded that:

There are religious fanatics in the country, callous enough to kill innocent women and children as part of what they regard as holy war... Whether they are ignorant people, misguided elements, or criminals in the garb of religious warriors, they are a factor to reckon with in the context of any plan or strategy to combat terrorism and religious extremism.²⁸

Similarly, on the foreign and security policy front, the Musharraf regime felt an urgency to re-examine and rethink Pakistan's national security imperatives given the changed circumstances. The following words capture the critical situation very vividly:

Support for the Taliban – seen as the guarantors of an Afghanistan that could provide Pakistan 'strategic depth' – helped convert large swathes of our tribal areas and cities like Chaman into strongholds of the Pak-Afghan Taliban where the government writ did not run. The support for the freedom struggle in Kashmir in the name of Islam rather than in the name of Kashmiri nationalism and Kashmiriyat provided with or without official support gave fresh impetus to forces based in Pakistan that boasted of an agenda for over throwing all secular or moderate regimes in the Muslim countries.²⁹

President Musharraf prior to 9/11 initiated number of steps to improve law and order and check the rising tide of religious extremism within the country. On August 14, 2001, General Musharraf announced a ban on Lashkar-I-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Mohammed.³⁰ Similarly, on June 18, 2001 the

²⁶ Christophe Jaffrelot, *op.cit.*, p.259.

²⁷ Note: In 1987, of the 777 terrorist incidents recorded worldwide, 90% took place in Pakistan. In 1989, there were only 10 incidents of sectarian violence and by year 2001 there were 261 such incidents occurring mostly in the largest province of Pakistan, Punjab. Quoted in, Mary Ann Weaver, *Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan*, (New York: Straus and Giroux, 2002).

²⁸ Khalid Mahmud, "Time to Tame Fanatics", *Dawn*, November 6 2001.

²⁹ Najmuddin A. Shaikh, "Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan's Foreign Policy in the Changed Global Environment", *Margalla Papers 2004*, (Islamabad: National Defense College, 2004), p.5.

³⁰ Quoted in, Syed Rifaat Hussain, *op.cit.*, p.40.

‘Pakistan Madrassa Education Board Ordinance 2001’ was promulgated. According to this Ordinance, over 10,000 religious seminaries – Madrassas – were to be brought into the public education system through registration, curriculum reform and financial audit.³¹ To date limited success has been achieved.

President Musharraf himself admitted that his Madrassa reforms are being implemented slowly: “There are about 10,000 of them (Madrassas) and there are about 1 million poor students getting free boarding and lodging. These madrassas are doing a welfare service to the poor. The negative side is that most of them are teaching religion, so my belief is that we need to carry out reforms to reinforce their strengths and eliminate their weaknesses”³². In the events that followed 9/11 President Musharraf was able to crack down on organizations that had set up a ‘state within a state’ – and consolidate state (his) power.

In the events that followed 9/11 President Musharraf was able to ...consolidate state (his) power

Vulnerable economy

In the late 1990s Pakistan’s faltering economy, overwhelming dependence on external financial resources with a spiraling debt burden and corruption within the state institutions, became a critical factor overshadowing a prosperous and stable outlook. As for foreign debt (48.4 per cent of the total in 2000), over the course of a veritable ‘lost decade’ from 1990-91 to 1999-2000, it went from \$20.66 billion to \$37 billion.³³ As a result, debt servicing represented 45 per cent of budget spending (and 63 per cent of receipts) in 2000.³⁴ General Musharraf when asked what was his key priority in an interview in November 2000 said:

The economy. Only with a viable economy will the security of Pakistan be guaranteed. Economic revival is the key to everything. Out of a nation of 150 million people, only 1 percent pays income tax. Our debt burden is \$38 billion, and we have to prioritize reducing it. My program, simply put, is to concentrate on reducing our fiscal deficit, improving our trade balance, and broadening our tax base. We also have to privatize our assets, which are being mismanaged, and revive our moribund industries.³⁵

In 2000, Pakistan’s fiscal deficit was 5.3 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), against a desired level of 4.0 per cent. The total debt including external and internal debt stood at 92 per cent of GDP. By 2000, more than three quarters of the federal budget was going to defense and debt servicing,

³¹ Quoted in Syed Rifaat Hussain, “War against Terrorism: A Pakistani Perspective”, *ibid*.

³² President Musharraf Interview in, *Financial Times*, March 6, 2001.

³³ The country’s main creditors at the time were Japan (4,827 million dollars), the USA (2,702 million), Germany (1,280 million) and France (1,276 million). Quoted in Christophe Jaffrelot, ed., *A History of Pakistan and its Origins*, op.cit., pp.262, 314.

³⁴ *Ibid*.

³⁵ President General Pervaz Musharraf’s interview, quoted in Mary Ann Weaver, *Pakistan: In the Shadow of Jihad and Afghanistan*, op.cit, p.23.

By 2000, more than three quarters of the federal budget was going to defense and debt servicing

with little left for social and human development.³⁶ The Musharraf government undertook several measures to put the economy back on track. These included: imposition of General Sales Tax on electricity; following oil-price mechanism (this led to price rise of 7.5 to 22.5 per cent); abolishing some wheat subsidies; curtailing public sector jobs by 12 percent; and tax on agricultural income.³⁷ Most significantly, the Musharraf regime decided to reduce the defence budget by 5 per cent as part of its economic recovery plan.³⁸

In late 2000, the IMF Administrative Council, in recognition of Musharraf's efforts, voted a 'standby' allocation of \$596 million – unanimously, except for USA, which was still suspicious of Pakistan. This paved the way for the Club of Paris to sign an agreement to reschedule Pakistan's external public debt on January 22, 2001.³⁹ However, despite these steps economic recovery was not in sight. To quote the western press,

Last year India's economy was the second fastest-growing in the world... During the same period, however, Pakistan went down a different path, one of radical Islam and domestic dysfunction. The results? In 1985, its per capita gross domestic product was 6.5 percent higher than India; today it is 23 percent lower. Its birthrate is soaring at a frightening 2.8 percent, while India's is 1.7 percent and dropping. Thirty percent of Pakistan's economy is consumed by its military... President Musharraf has broken Pakistan's fall. And he realizes now that to modernize Pakistan he needs peace with India. But the country is proving hard to turn around; the rot has set in deep.⁴⁰

The above observation leads into the second part of the paper that highlights the critical aspects of Pakistan's security strategy after allying with the US-led Global War on Terrorism in late 2001. The changes thereafter are accompanied by the challenges to the national security of Pakistan, and are of an external as well as a specifically internal character. Since then, Pakistan has walked a tight rope: the domestic scene is complex enough and fraught with dangers, so is the external environment. Following action against the Tribal areas adjacent to Afghanistan, the domestic political, religious, ethnic and anti-US fault lines have become more obvious. As a result, state action on one front threatens to derail movement on the other front. In short, the nexus between the internal and external security challenges is extremely complex and difficult to detach from one another.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Quoted in, Syed Rifaat Hussain, op.cit, pp. 243-244.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Christophe Jaffrelot, op.cit, p.264.

⁴⁰ Fareed Zakaria, "Opening in South Asia" *Washington Post*, January 9, 2004.

3 | Part Two: Pakistan's Security Policy after 9/11 – Change with Challenges

Pakistan's President General Pervez Musharraf in a public address to the nation on September 19, 2001 proffered five reasons for choosing to offer "unstinted co-operation"⁴¹ to the US in its war against terrorism. The five reasons for choosing this course of action were:

1. Secure Pakistan's strategic assets,
2. Safeguard the cause of Kashmir,
3. Prevent Pakistan from being declared a terrorist state,
4. Prevent an anti-Pakistani government from coming to power in Kabul,
5. Have Pakistan re-emerge politically as a responsible and dignified nation.⁴²

Domestic political, religious, ethnic and anti-US fault lines have become more obvious

The decision marked a u-turn in Pakistan's decades long security policy with respect to Afghanistan and set in motion the redefinition of its strategic priorities accompanied by the immense challenges on the home front. Here an argument can be made that, as discussed earlier in the part one, the Musharraf government's decision to ally with the US was a rational choice based on the realization of prevailing domestic (economic, social, political, sectarian threats), regional and international trends prior to 9/11. To quote Pakistani security analyst Syed Rifaat Hussain, the qualitative shift in Pakistan's pro-Taliban policy was based on the several key considerations:

Come out on the right side of history; avoid American retribution; prevent the emergence of an Indo-US axis against Pakistan with dire consequences for country's survival; clear sense of gains: get sanctions lifted, put Pak-US ties back on track, gain international legitimacy for his military regime and most importantly create political and social space for Pakistan to deal with the 'blow-back effects' of the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan on Pakistani society.⁴³

Here a plausible question is whether Pakistan achieved all of the following stated objectives. To probe and analyze such a concern, one should be mindful of the idea that it is very easy to cut down an old tree and very difficult to grow the same size tree in short time span. The same applies to Pakistan's security concerns – the change that is desired, as set out in President Musharraf's speeches, requires sustained efforts and the road to reformation or transformation that has recently begun is full of real challenges. In other

⁴¹ Quoted in Ahmed Farauqi, *Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan*, (UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2003), pp.xviii-xix. Note: The US government told all countries to choose sides: "either you are with us or you are with them". The US gave Pakistan a list of 18 demands, and General Musharraf after a marathon session of his senior commanders decided to accept all the demands, ranging from sharing intelligence, logistic support, use of Pakistani airspace and so on.

⁴² President Pervez Musharraf speech, <<http://www.nation.com.pk/daily/Sep-2003/main/top5.asp>>.

⁴³ Syed Rifaat Hussain, "War against Terrorism: A Pakistani Perspective", op.cit, p.242.

words, the objectives quoted above remain Islamabad's guiding themes in the national security arena, and each one is a challenge in its own right. The result so far has been mixed, positive as well as negative, both at the domestic and external level.

Secure Pakistan's strategic assets

Post-9/11 the protection of nuclear assets has become more critical than ever before

Without going into the background of why Pakistan opted for a nuclear capability as means to secure and safeguard its territorial integrity against a hostile India, post-9/11 the protection of nuclear assets has become more critical than ever before. While the international community remains conscious of the safety and security of Pakistan's strategic assets and the threat of them falling into the 'wrong hands', the Musharraf government remains committed to the aim of

prevention of a nuclear and ballistic arms race, avoidance of nuclear conflict, risk reduction mechanisms, formalizing the moratorium on nuclear testing, non-induction of anti-ballistic missile and submarine launched ballistic missiles, as well as keeping the deterrence capability at minimum level⁴⁴

In early December 2003 debriefing of nuclear scientists was carried out by Islamabad, in the wake of compelling pressure from the international community, primarily the US and UN nuclear agency (the International Atomic Energy Agency – IAEA). US intelligence officials and the alleged that Pakistan was responsible for providing "critical technology and parts" to Tehran's nascent nuclear weapons program.⁴⁵ Islamabad's official investigations identified the corruption of individuals (Dr Qadeer Khan 'Pakistan's nuclear hero' – publicly accepted these charges) and venality as the motivation of such action.⁴⁶ The Dr Qadeer saga finally ended when the 'national hero' was pardoned by President Musharraf, acting in the best interest of Pakistan. Granting pardon to the Dr A. Q. Khan for his proliferation activities, President Musharraf categorically stated:

There will be no roll-back of Pakistan's nuclear and missile programs... the international community should take note of the underworld and Pakistan cannot be singled out for being involved in the issue. This underworld, has a network in European and Asian countries and a number of countries have relied on developing their programs on this underworld... As President of Pakistan I have decided to pardon Dr A.

⁴⁴ Speech by Pakistan's Foreign Minister Khurshid M. Kasuri, The European Institute for Asian Studies, Lund, November 6, 2003 <<http://www.eias.org/specialbriefing/regional/sec611/pakistanfrminister.pdf>>.

⁴⁵ Note: In December 2004, US intelligence officials and the IAEA said "Iranian officials disclosed that Pakistani's were among middlemen who the Iranian said had aided Iran's nuclear program. US intelligence officials also said they believed that Pakistan had traded nuclear technology to North Korea in exchange for missile technology. The US further said that Pakistan was the source for designs of centrifuges used by Libya's in its recently disclosed nuclear program". *China Daily*, January 19, 2004.

⁴⁶ *China Daily*, January 19, 2004. Also see, *The News*, *The Nation*, *Dawn*, January 2004 editions.

Q. Khan, who is our hero but has committed mistakes that I regret.... It is incumbent on all Pakistanis to keep Pakistan foremost and ahead of all considerations when it comes to critical national interests.⁴⁷

However, analysts observe that the need to improve and institute security, and safety measures of the strategic assets remains critical. The fact remains that Pakistan's image has been tarnished by such charges of being involved in nuclear proliferation and the Musharraf government's efforts to prove these acts as 'personal acts of corruption' have not closed the chapter. These revelations have been termed as 'tip of the ice-berg' by the IAEA officials. To quote Najmuddin A. Shaikh, Pakistan's former Foreign Secretary:

The cost of acquiring or disseminating technology relating to weapons of mass destruction is extremely high. In Pakistan's case the officially articulated view in Washington suggests acceptance that these were the acts of individuals but such forbearance is clearly owed to the perceived need – in the light of the Afghan situation – to maintain relations with the present government in Pakistan on an even keel.⁴⁸

Commenting on what all this means for Pakistan's security challenges, another analyst observes:

For the future, the countries like Pakistan will be dragged into the WMD issue. For Pakistan, the issue is critical because this pretext could be a means of trying to target Pakistan's nuclear programme that sits uneasily with the US. And since WMD remains one of the rationalizations for the US pre-emptive doctrine, the present framing of the WMD issue impacts and aggravates Pakistan's security concerns.⁴⁹

Another parallel trend in Pakistan's security policy after 9/11 has been how to safeguard the cause of Kashmir and prepare or face the challenge of compromise on Kashmir in the future. This is a complex issue encompassing several equally essential issues, that is, to sustain peace with India and not to be seen as a sanctuary for terrorists.

Safeguard the cause of Kashmir and achieve peace with India and prevent being labeled a 'terrorist' state

Another critical and challenging aim Pakistan's security policy today is how to maintain a delicate balance between support for the war against terrorism, and rethink and reword the earlier position on the Kashmir dispute – an issue that has been termed as a 'nuclear flashpoint' between the arch rivals and neighbors, India and Pakistan. The Pakistan-India relationship remains the

Pakistan's image has been tarnished by such charges of being involved in nuclear proliferation

⁴⁷ President Musharraf quoted in, *Pakistan Times*, February 6, 2004.

⁴⁸ Najmuddin A. Shaikh, "Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan's Foreign Policy in the Changed Global Environment", *Margalla Papers 2004*, op.cit., p.6.

⁴⁹ Dr Shireen M. Mazari, "Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan", *Margalla Papers 2004*, op.cit., p.23.

central plank of Pakistan's security policy and the nexus between internal and external dynamics has become more enmeshed than ever before.

On the external front, 9/11 has been a watershed, not only because it enabled Islamabad to be readmitted into the international community, but it also forced Pakistan to rethink its earlier Afghanistan and Kashmir policies respectively. To quote Mushahid Hussain:

Pakistan's policymakers realized that the 'Jihad Triangle' that had emerged since 1980s, with Pakistani volunteers training in Afghanistan to fight in other conflicts like, Kashmir, Chechnya, Xinging, Uzbekistan or Tajikistan, was no longer sustainable.⁵⁰

The nexus between internal and external dynamics has become more enmeshed than ever before

Following the October 1, 2001 attack on the Jammu and Kashmir State Assembly in Srinagar, and the December 13, 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament in New Delhi, Indo-Pak relations reached a very low ebb. This resulted in the year-long military standoff between the two sides, with the break out of full-scale hostilities a very real possibility. The Indian government held Islamabad responsible for 'cross border terrorism' in Indian-held Kashmir despite Pakistan's strong and swift condemnation of such incidents. All this resulted in Washington playing a key role in diffusing the tensions between India and Pakistan with the aim of avoiding any conflict, since such a conflict could lead Pakistan to withdraw its troops from the Afghan border, and impact on the military campaign in Afghanistan. US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage visited India and Pakistan in June 2002 as part of US peace diplomacy between the two sides. The US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visit to Islamabad and Delhi followed this visit. Reflecting on the US crises management role in the Indo-Pak military standoff, US Senator Richard Lugar observed that "war was averted, barely thanks to intense, discreet diplomacy by the United States."⁵¹

Diplomatic, air and road links, and economic relations were suspended through out this phase of strained Indo-Pak relations. President Musharraf responding to the Indian rising war threats and Washington pressure, on January 12, 2002, in an hour-long speech to the nation announced tough measures against extremists within Pakistan. He said:

Sectarian terrorism has been going on for years... The day of reckoning has come. Do we want Pakistan to be a theocratic state? Do we believe that religious education alone is enough for governance or do we want Pakistan to emerge as a progressive and dynamic welfare state?...Today Pakistan is not facing any threat from outside. But the real threats are posed from within... I would request that we should stop interfering with the affairs of others...⁵²

⁵⁰ Mushahid Hussain, *Gulf News*, 2004.

⁵¹ Quoted in, Rizwan Zeb, "US Interests in South Asia in Post 9/11 Era: Effects on Pakistan", *Margalla Papers 2004*, (National Defence College, Islamabad), pp.73-89.

⁵² "President Musharraf's Speech", quoted in, Christophe Jaffrelot, op.cit, p.273.

The speech marked an understanding of the intricate relationship between the threat of terrorism as an internal threat to Pakistan's security with the external concerns primarily managing relations with India, Afghanistan, and USA. This fact explains the measures Musharraf announced on January 12, 2002: all Madrassas had to register with the authorities by March 23, just as foreign students were obliged to; speedy trial courts to punish those suspected of terrorist acts; above all, the Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-i-Tayyiba, Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan, Tehrik-I Jafria Pakistan and Tanzim Nifaz-I Shari'ah-I Mohammadi were banned.⁵³ Of these six banned extremist Islamic groups, two of them, Lashkar-i-Tayyiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, were also been designated as terrorist groups by the US State Department.⁵⁴

On the question of Islamabad's Kashmir policy, President Musharraf walked a tight rope, on the one hand not to upset the domestic scenario, he continued to maintain, "... the Kashmiri cause is in his blood...and Pakistan will continue to support the cause morally, diplomatically, and politically."⁵⁵ On the other hand, conscious of Pakistan not being bracketed as a state sponsoring terrorism regionally or internationally, President Musharraf held: "no organization will be able to carry out terrorism on the pretext of Kashmir."⁵⁶ Parallel to this the National Kashmir Committee was set up by Islamabad under the presidency of the moderate Mohammed Abdul Qayyum Khan, former President of Azad Kashmir. The objective of this Kashmir Committee was to continue the Kashmir movement by 'new means'. All this illustrates the significance of Kashmir issue as the essential security issue and challenge that impacts security both within and outside the country.

At this juncture, one needs to be mindful of the vitality of Pakistan's security and insecurity threat perceptions vis-à-vis India that continue to shape and influence its strategic priorities. The important leverage that the US has come to enjoy in wake of a once again warmed relationship with Islamabad was evident in its brisk diplomatic offensive between the two arch rivals and the US being a 'peace maker' in between. Following US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's visit to New Delhi and Islamabad in June 2002, both India and Pakistan agreed to end the year long military stand off and thus lessen the war clouds hovering over them. The US was given an assurance by President Musharraf that he would 'permanently' end 'cross-border infiltration' into Indian-held Kashmir. This pledge led to the long awaited

⁵³ Note: Following this announcement, militant members of these movements were immediately targeted. Pakistan's Interior Ministry maintained that 1,900 activists were arrested and 600 organizational headquarters were closed down in four days. However, most of them were freed thereafter.

⁵⁴ Note: In the late 1990s the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen was designated as Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) and has remained on the US blacklist ever since. Following the attacks on the Indian Parliament and the Jammu and Kashmir Assembly in 2001, the US banned the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi was named as FTO by the US State department in January 2003. This group is believed to be responsible for the January 2002 abduction and murder of the *Wall Street Journal* reporter Daniel Pearl in Karachi. Plus Lashkar-e-Jhangvi was also held responsible for the March 2002 Karachi bus bombing that killed 15 people, including 11 French technicians. The LJ is also reported to have links with the Al-Qaeda.

<<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2001/html/10252.htm>>.

⁵⁵ Quoted in, Christophe Jaffreot, op.cit.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

positive response from the Indian leadership and set in motion the improvement of bilateral relations between India and Pakistan.

Broadening the horizons of 'security' to include 'comprehensive or human security' within the ambit of policy making promises a better future

Following the former Indian Prime Minister visit to Islamabad to attend the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit in January 2004, the normalization process continues with the composite dialogue between the two sides based on a set of issues rather than focused on resolving Kashmir first and other issues later on. With the change of leadership in India and Congress replacing BJP at the highest level of decision-making, peace prospects remain unchanged provided New Delhi and Islamabad remain committed to a broad based and composite dialogue with the genuine spirit for 'long awaited peace' in South Asia. Broadening the horizons of 'security' to include 'comprehensive or human security' within the ambit of policy making promises a better future not only for Pakistan or India – but for the whole of South Asia. To quote from the Human Development Report:

...destiny of South Asia will be shaped by the collaborative efforts of its own people. Its future prospects are not pre-ordained, nor do they depend on external factors. They primarily depend on domestic actions. South Asia must engineer a break from its past if it is to emerge as a dynamic region in the 21st century. There is still time for South Asia's political leaders, bureaucrats, and private sector to act on vital historical lessons. The next millennium can begin with the South Asian century but only if South Asia's leaders have the vision to make it so. Otherwise the prospects look bleak.⁵⁷

This leads us to another string of Pakistan's security imperative, which is an aim, trend, and a challenge domestically and internationally: to have a peaceful and stable Afghanistan.

A Peaceful and stable Afghanistan and deal with home-grown religious militancy

In the words of Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Khurshid M. Kasuri:

Afghanistan has been a country in turmoil for the last 25 years now. The Western world "used" Afghanistan in the 80s and then abandoned it with disdain. With the ouster of the Taliban and the establishment of the Interim Administration under the Bonn Agreement, a ray of hope has emerged. We, in Pakistan, fully support the government of President Karzai. We respect Afghanistan as an independent and sovereign State. Stability and peace in the country is imperative for us as well.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Mahbubul Haq and Khadija Haq, *Human Development in South Asia, 1998*.

⁵⁸ Speech by Foreign Minister Khurshid M. Kasuri, November 6, 2003.

<<http://www.eias.org/specialbriefing/regionalsec611/pakistanfrminster.pdf>>.

Pakistan's decision to be a 'front-line' state in the US-led campaign in Afghanistan has opened another critical chapter in its security policy, complicating and blurring lines between the external and internal threats. The US State Department maintains that Islamabad has facilitated the transfer of more than 400 captured alleged terrorists to US custody, including several top suspected Al Qaeda leaders.⁵⁹ Pakistan also ranks fourth in the world in seizing terrorist assets.⁶⁰

While Islamabad has been appreciated well for its initiatives throughout western policy making circles, the costs of this turn-around in its Afghan policy are both negative and positive. Islamabad has broken its diplomatic isolation, to some extent dealt with its earlier fragile/vulnerable economy, set in motion peace process with erstwhile rival India, and finally has once again become a critical ally of the United States. The welcome development has been to correct its image of that of a failing state to the one on the mend. Whether long-term results will yield a more politically stable and prosperous Pakistan within and beyond is too early to answer. One can argue that the journey has begun and call for sustenance at the policy-making and implementation level.

The costs of this turn-around in its Afghan policy are both negative and positive

To quote analyst Christophe Jafferlot: "When the Taliban fell, Pakistan lost its famous 'strategic depth' in Afghanistan: its rear base which, in theory, gave the country more clout in its dealings with India. This marked a complete failure of Pakistan's strategy in the region."⁶¹ As a result of the shift in earlier Afghan policy, President Musharraf has to undertake a number of steps to address the critical challenge of religious Islamic militancy – a home-grown phenomenon with spill over effects internationally.⁶² For the first time in Pakistan's history, troops have been deployed into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) beginning in June 2003 to capture Al Qaeda and Taliban militants, having refuge in the sympathetic Pashtun areas there. The result has been military operations undertaken in Waziristan agency⁶³, Wana⁶⁴ and actions along the Durand Line.⁶⁵ The Pashtun factor that remains a binding force across the Durand Line, at times is at odds with Islamabad's actions in the FATA.

The internal dynamics of Pakistan's political landscape are also impacted by such actions. President Musharraf has been criticized as a "sell out to the Americans", "Bushrraff", and "security risk" primarily by religious organizations like, Jamaat-i-Islami and there have been at least three reported

⁵⁹ Among those captured are Abu Zubaydah (March 2002), believed to be Al Qaeda's field commander; Ramzi bin al-Shibh (September 2002), said to be a key figure in the planning of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States; and Khalid Mohammed (March 2003), alleged mastermind of the September 2001 attacks and close associate of Osama bin Laden.

⁶⁰ U.S. Department of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism – 2002*, April 30, 2003.

⁶¹ Christophe Jafferlot, op.cit, p: 267.

⁶² See Ahmed Rashid's excellent analysis, "Post-Taliban Order is a Source of concern for Pakistan", eurasiaet.org, October 25, 2001.

⁶³ Mir Jamilur Rahman, "The Waziristan Operation", *The News*, February 28, 2004.

⁶⁴ *Pak Tribune*, April 29, 2004.

⁶⁵ Dr Shireen M. Mazari, "Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan", op.cit, pp.18-20.

attempts on his life⁶⁶ by banned 'Jihadi' groups. It is also observed in accounts that anti-Americanism⁶⁷ is on the rise in Pakistan, despite being a 'critical ally' in the global war on terrorism. As a consequence of this, there has been a regular series of terrorist incidents against American and western officials, media people, businesses and Pakistan's government setup and personnel as well as minorities and sectarian groups within the state. This precarious situation is well captured in the following observation:

Today Pakistan is a country under siege or at the very least Islamabad, the country's capital and Rawalpindi, its twin city and the home of the Army's headquarters are besieged... In Karachi, the only seaport of Pakistan and the principal centre of commercial and industrial activity, bomb blasts and the attendant insecurity have become commonplace occurrences. Sectarian killings, in mosques or in carefully planned attacks on specific individuals continue to occur at irregular intervals provoking the bitter comment that unlike fixed hunting periods for game birds it is 'open season' for the killing of Shias.⁶⁸

Parallel to this, cultivating and maintaining stable and friendly relations with the present Afghan government headed by President Hamid Karzai remains a key security objective of Islamabad. The challenges are multi-level: India's perceived closeness and influence in Afghanistan and the presence of NATO forces are all matters of long term security that Islamabad has to grapple with. At this juncture concluding thoughts and some plausible recommendations are put forth as a way forward for Pakistan's comprehensive national security posture in the long run.

⁶⁶ M. B. Naqvi, "Scourge of Terrorism", *The News*, December 31, 2003.

⁶⁷ Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947 – 2000: Disenchanted Allies*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

⁶⁸ Najmuddin A. Shaikh, "Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan's Foreign Policy in the Changed Global Environment", op.cit, p.6.

4 | Concluding Thoughts / Policy Recommendations

As the foregoing suggests, the costs and challenges attached to Islamabad's decision to take the 'less traveled' path in its security milieu are complex in nature and fall in between its domestic and foreign security imperatives. To re-position Pakistan as a 'dynamic and moderate' country is an ongoing and an uphill task and requires long-term sustained efforts at the government and societal level. Who can help Pakistan achieve this vision? Obviously only Pakistanis can accomplish this task for themselves, but the international community can contribute a lot here. In the words of the head of US Central Command General Abizaid: "This is a battle of ideas as much as it is a military battle and we have got to help him [Musharraf] fight that battle."⁶⁹

There is a dire need to invest in the human capital of Pakistan

The challenge for Pakistan today is essentially internal but the international climate creates an opportunity for getting the international support that could help to meet the challenge. The United States' role is critical here, as stipulated in its 'National Security Strategy of the United States of America', issued in September 2002, the White House has indicated that it would "invest time and resources [into] building strong bilateral relations with India and Pakistan". Adding that US-Pakistan relations had been "bolstered by Pakistan's choice to join the war against terror and move towards building a more open and tolerant society."⁷⁰ Similar thoughts are articulated in the President Musharraf's words:

In Islam, Jihad is not confined to military struggles only. Have we ever thought of waging Jihad against illiteracy, poverty, backwardness, and hunger? This is the larger Jihad. Pakistan, in my opinion, needs to wage Jihad against these evils.⁷¹

Pakistan currently ranks 9th among the 117 market economies in terms of defense spending as a share of total expenditure, but at the same time it is 2nd among the 34 poorest economies worldwide. Pakistan ranks 17th in education, and 34th in health per capita expenditure in the 34 poorest economies.⁷² There is a dire need to invest in the human capital of Pakistan, as with the change of 'mindset', so that prospects for a stable Pakistan within and beyond are more secure.

⁶⁹ "Pakistan, Saudi Arabia face major terror threat: US", *Dawn* January 30, 2004.

⁷⁰ For details see, Richard L. Kugler, "A Distinctly American Internationalism for a Globalized World". <<http://www.usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1202/ijpe/ijpe1202.htm>>.

⁷¹ President Musharraf speech, as reported at <<http://www.the-globalist.com/nor/gdoc/2002/01-27-02.html>>.

⁷² For details see, Ziauddin, "Neither Secure nor Developed", available at: <<http://www.Pakistanlink.com/Opinion/2000/June/16/01.html>>.

The discussion of the trends in Pakistan's security policy stresses the need for a concerted and proactive strategy to cope with the multi-dimensional threats to its security. This in turn calls for introspection, reflection and redefinition of national security by not measuring it in military might alone but also incorporating the civilian components of national security such as democracy, rule of law, economy, and education.

Policy recommendations

Pakistan's security needs to be defined and examined in a comprehensive and integrated framework both at the national and international level. What Pakistan needs is a comprehensive approach to security, where

A threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that (1) threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of the state or (2) threatens significantly to the narrow range of policy choices available to the government of a state or private non-government entities (person, group, corporations) within the state.⁷³

Security of Pakistan should be approached in a holistic manner. That is, a vibrant civic and political order, economic stability, and moderate educational and religious institutions must compliment military preparedness.

Peace and stability at home is critical for achieving an enduring peace at the regional level. This in turn calls for an investment in the human capital of the nation. The state system of education along with the traditional religious centers of learning needs to be reformed to ensure a moderate and dynamic future for the nation.

The economic prosperity of the state needs to be filtered down to the poor sections of society. Poverty alleviation and underdevelopment must be included in the comprehensive national security framework. The persistence of economic and social deprivation serves only to exacerbate the forces of chauvinism, religious intolerance, and ethnic cleavages. Thus, the state must create and promote an environment that facilitates economic and social stability at home and beyond.

In sum, Pakistan's national security today depends on achieving a healthy blend of three M's, namely: Money – stable and healthy economy; Muscle – military strength, and; Mind – moderate outlook.

⁷³ Richard Ullman, "Redefining Security", *International Security*, Vol. 8, summer 1983, pp.129; 133-135.

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