

CD Agenda in 2011: Critical Appraisal

By

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The lingering stalemate at the international Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, Switzerland, has initiated a debate on the practicability of this arms control/ disarmament forum despite its record of achievements in the prevention of an international arms race¹. The United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon reaffirmed his confidence in the great potential of the CD to play an instrumental role in advancing the disarmament agenda on January 26, 2011². Simultaneously, he warned that “the very credibility of this body was at risk. Continued inaction would only endanger its future as a multilateral negotiating forum.”³ Rose Gottemoeller, the United States Assistant Secretary of State, while unequivocally recommending the start of fissile material cutoff treaty negotiations in the CD had intimidated that, “If we cannot find a way to begin these negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, then we will need to consider options.”⁴ The role of the CD in evolving consensus and constituting arms control and disarmament agreements/treaties is inevitable. The current pessimism about the CD’s function is due to the non-implementation of the 2009 session program of work and its failure to start substantive work in 2010 session. Though the prevailing

trends in the international high-politics are not conducive for consensus building on the CD Agenda in 2011, yet the impression that the Conference has been gradually losing its utility seems an irrational conclusion.

The CD began its first session this year on January 25, 2011. The Conference adopted the annual agenda and approved membership of Observer States, but was not able to agree on a program of work. The disagreement on the program of work was due to the divergence of opinion among the CD delegates on a fissile material cut-off treaty. The CD President Ambassador Grinius from Canada explained at the beginning of the 2011 session that during his consultations, it became clear that some members were willing to accept a program of work, only if it included negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, while at least one member did not accept a program of work if there were negotiations on a FMCT.⁵

The general impression is that Pakistan is the only state, which has been obstructing the CD Agenda in the present 2011 session. Since the mid-1990s, Islamabad has been insisting on the negotiations on Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) and only opposing the FMCT for its lack of a dis-

1. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) is a successor of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The Conference officially changed its name in 1983, and its membership grew to 38. Today the CD has 65 members.
2. United Nations Secretary-General Urges Conference on Disarmament to Live up to its Potential, The United Nations Office at Geneva, January 26, 2011. [http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/\(httpNewsByYear_en\)/7C77A3CDEB64692AC1257824005B9309?OpenDocument](http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/(httpNewsByYear_en)/7C77A3CDEB64692AC1257824005B9309?OpenDocument), accessed on January 27, 2011.
3. Ibid.
4. Rose Gottemoeller, United States Assistant Secretary of State, statement at the CD on January 27, 2011. <http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/2011/reports.html>, accessed on March 7, 2011.
5. Conference on Disarmament Holds First plenary Session of 2011, The United Nations Office at Geneva, January 25, 2011. [http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/\(httpNewsByYear_en\)/78D4B45D3569A799C125782300458999?OpenDocument](http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/(httpNewsByYear_en)/78D4B45D3569A799C125782300458999?OpenDocument), accessed on January 30, 2011.

armament constituent. More precisely, it is not agreeing to the current status of the FMCT which bans the future production of fissile material, but does not include the already present fissile stocks that the states possess. Importantly, Islamabad maintains that it does not want to see a stalemate in the CD. It supports substantive progress on the other core issues of the CD agenda, i.e. Nuclear Disarmament, Negative Security Assurances and Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space.⁶

Islamabad's refusal to succumb to pressure in the CD on the subject of the FMCT has annoyed the nuclear abolitionists and also disturbed the United States and its like-minded states. Its opposition to the selectivity, exceptionalism, discrimination and double standards, which have been employed at the cost of international principles as well as commitments to facilitate and boost India's nuclear and space programs irritates the international nuclear commercial lobby. Numerous nuclear supplier states have been endeavoring to invest in India's gigantic nuclear market. These states have been giving priority to their commercial businesses rather than the norms of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Pakistan's reiteration of its stance on FMCT in the CD has frustrated many at the Conference, and thereby they have launched a systematic campaign against its stance. On January 30, 2011, the Washington Post while discussing FMCT

pointed out: "Pakistan has long been the lone holdout."⁷ The objective of this campaign is either to transform Pakistan's firm position on the FMCT or adopt new arms control and disarmament negotiation procedures to bypass and defy Pakistan's stance. The United Nations Secretary-General stated on January 26, 2011: "Just one or two countries must not be able to block the process indefinitely. Moreover, they must not risk pushing States to resort to alternative arrangements outside the Conference on Disarmament."⁸ He added: "With respect to the Fissile Material Treaty, it was clear that within the Conference, there was almost universal support for negotiations on such a treaty. While many Members continued to hope that formal negotiations would take place in the Conference, a number of Members had recently suggested that alternative arrangements should be explored."⁹

The UN Secretary General was drawing attention of the delegates in the CD on one issue, i.e. production of the fissile material, which has already been addressed in the Article VI of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty—provided it is executed sincerely by the nuclear weapon states. This limited approach or support to a single item of an agenda is not encouraging to the comprehensive arms control and disarmament initiative in the Conference. For instance, the most important item of the CD's Agenda, i.e. Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space, has not

6. Statement by Ambassador Zamir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the UN and other International Organizations at the Conference on Disarmament, Pakistan Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Geneva, January 25, 2011, pp 3-4.

7. Karen DeYoung, "New estimates put Pakistan's nuclear arsenal at more than 100," The Washington Post, January 30, 2011. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/30/AR2011013004136.html>, accessed on January 31, 2011.

8. United Nations Secretary-General Urges Conference on Disarmament to Live up to its Potential, The United Nations Office at Geneva, January 26, 2011. [http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/\(httpNewsByYear_en\)/7C77A3CDEB64692AC1257824005B9309?OpenDocument](http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/(httpNewsByYear_en)/7C77A3CDEB64692AC1257824005B9309?OpenDocument), accessed on January 27, 2011.

9. Ibid.

received serious attention of the delegates at the Conference. The United States has been endeavoring to place missile-space beds in the outer space for its missile-interceptor batteries deployment.

In this context, this study aims at critically examining the CD Agenda in 2011, particularly the four core issues and underscores the explicit and implicit challenges to the CD Agenda in 2011.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The majority of CD observers have either deliberately ignored or failed to realize five-interlinked factors, which could facilitate or frustrate the CD Agenda in 2011. Arms control and disarmament initiatives are the product of the regional and international strategic environment. Secondly, in the prevailing anarchical international system, sovereign states have to rely on their own self-help strategies for their survival and thereby an arms control and disarmament agreement/treaty which undermines their defensive fence is bound to be straightforwardly rejected. Third, in the realm of high-politics, national interest defined in terms of commercial and military context is a deterministic variable rather than idealistic non-proliferation norms. Fourth, the international treaty or agreement formation is primarily based on two principles, i.e. reciprocity between sacrifices and benefits; and on principle of universality. Finally, the conventional arms control and disarmament is a prerequisite for nuclear arms control and disarmament between/among the regional and global strategic competitors.

The movement for nuclear-free-world, and the realization to construct fool-proof safety and security arrangements for ensuring nuclear infrastructure/material safety and security have invigorated progressive discourse on nuclear arms control and disarmament in the CD. A few noteworthy nuclear arms control initiatives are: President Obama's speech at Prague on April 5, 2009, in which he disclosed his vision of a nuclear-weapons-free world; the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1887 on September 24, 2009;¹⁰ signing of New START on April 8, 2010 and its subsequent ratification by the United States Senate in December 2010; and the Russian State Duma in January 2011; Nuclear Security Summit on April 12-13, 2010, and consensus on the final document of eighth Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference on May 28, 2010—the first in ten years. These developments have had a positive impact on the subject of nuclear terrorism; to maintain and reinforce NPT and various regimes and initiatives that compliment it; the entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); and the commencement of negotiations on FMCT.

The preceding positive initiatives have been immensely countered by the negative parallel developments in the realm of nuclear and missile modernization. The United States 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Report, released on April 6, 2010, called for making investment to rebuild America's aging nuclear infrastructure.¹¹ On May 13, 2010 President Obama sent a bill to the Senate,

10. Resolution 1887 (2009) Adopted by the Security Council at its 6191st meeting, on September 24, 2009. <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/523/74/PDF/N0952374.pdf?OpenElement>. Accessed on May 13, 2010.

11. The report is required by Congress and is meant to establish US nuclear policy, strategy and capabilities. The Obama review was the third such exercise: The first occurred under President Bill Clinton in 1994 and the second under President George W. Bush in 2002. Only Obama's was published in full; the earlier reports were summarized and excerpted. The NPR cover-letter prepared by Secretary Gates called for making much-needed investments to rebuild America's aging nuclear infrastructure.

which demands \$85 billion in nuclear funding. Defense Secretary Robert Gates explained that the funds, which would be spent over a decade, were needed to ‘rebuild and sustain America’s aging nuclear stockpile.’¹² In addition, the United States and its allies have been developing missile defense systems, which have inbuilt strategic destabilizing ingredients. The development, deployment and operationalization of missile defense systems would completely transform the current making of nuclear deterrent strategy. In addition, the function of the NPT regime has begun to show signs of disintegration, most vividly with the exemption granted to the US-India civil nuclear deal by the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) in 2008 and by the uneven implementation of its own obligations.¹³

In the context of South Asia, the Indo-US strategic partnership amounts to a paradigm shift in strategic terms and severely damaged the credibility of the twentieth-century well-constituted nuclear non-proliferation regime. It will have the effect of boosting India’s nuclear and missile capabilities. In addition, with the assistance of Washington and Tel Aviv, the Indians have been perfecting their both offensive and defensive missiles. Once missile defense systems would have been operationalized, it would completely transform the twentieth century nuclear deterrence strategy. Hence, intellectual and political movements in favor of FMCT or nuclear-weapons-free South Asia in particular and entire world in general suffer from uncon-

vincing rationales, inherent contradictions, and unrealistic expectations.

***Agenda and program of work
for the 2011 session***

The Conference of Disarmament adopted by consensus an agenda for its 2011 session on January 25, 2011. The agenda remains unchanged from previous years,¹⁴ and contains following eight items:

1. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament.
2. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters.
3. Prevention of an arms race in outer space.
4. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
5. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons.
6. Comprehensive programme of disarmament.
7. Transparency in armaments.
8. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly of the United Nations.”

The preceding items have been divided into core and non-core items. Ac-

12. The Obama administration has proposed additional spending of “well over \$100 billion” on nuclear weapon delivery systems, including new land-based missiles, new submarine-launched missiles, new submarines and bombers. Washington Post, May 14, 2010.

13. Duncan Smith, “Perspective on the Revival of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Regime in the Wake of President Barack Obama’s Prague Speech,” *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, Vol. 21, 2010, pp. 180-183. 190

14. “Agenda and programme of work for the 2010 session,” in Report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly of the United Nations, Conference on Disarmament, CD/1900, September 14, 2010, pp. 4-5.9?OpenDocument, accessed on January 30, 2011.

ording to Marius Grinius, (Canada), President of the Conference on Disarmament the CD delegates were interested to focus on the following four core issues:¹⁵

1. Nuclear disarmament;
2. A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices;
3. The prevention of an arms race to outer space; and
4. Negative security assurances.

CRITICAL APPRAISAL

Since May 2009, the delegates at the 65-nations Conference on Disarmament have been seriously deliberating on the four core issues.¹⁶ Significantly, their interest on the other non-core issues contained in the CD's agenda seems almost non-existent. In the 2011 session of the CD, the FMCT is reckoned as the cause of disagreement on the program of work. Nevertheless, the other core items of the agenda also have failed to receive a serious attention from the delegates in the CD. The leading powers have refused to negotiate sincerely on nuclear disarmament; the prevention of an arms race to outer space; and negative security assurances. The following discussion would

further highlight the debate on the core items of the CD Agenda in 2011.

NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

The delegates of the non-nuclear weapon states obviously advocate the virtues of nuclear disarmament in the CD sessions at Geneva. On January 26, 2011, the U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon also echoed a similar point of view in his speech. He stated: "The longer it persists, the graver the nuclear threat—from existing arsenals, from the proliferation of such weapons and from their possible acquisition by terrorists."¹⁷ Nevertheless, in practice, the primary focus of the positive developments (identified in the preceding section—Conceptual Framework) is on the arms control, prevention of horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear/radiological terrorism instead of nuclear disarmament. The nuclear weapon states are disinclined to implement Article VI, of the NPT. Interestingly, the Americans and Russians present their new START Treaty as a disarmament initiative. In reality, it is a mere arms control treaty between the two leading nuclear weapon states.

The New START: an arms control initiative

The recent finalization of the New START—which would verifiably

15. Conference on Disarmament Holds First plenary Session of 2011, The United Nations Office at Geneva, January 25, 2011. [http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/\(httpNewsByYear_en\)/78D4B45D3569A799C125782300458999?OpenDocument](http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/(httpNewsByYear_en)/78D4B45D3569A799C125782300458999?OpenDocument), accessed on January 30, 2011.

16. The representatives of the 65 member States participated in the work of the Conference. These nations are: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands (the), New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam and Zimbabwe.

17. United Nations Secretary-General Urges Conference on Disarmament to Live up to its Potential, The United Nations Office at Geneva, January 26, 2011. [http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/\(httpNewsByYear_en\)/7C77A3CDEB64692AC1257824005B9309?OpenDocument](http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B9C2E/(httpNewsByYear_en)/7C77A3CDEB64692AC1257824005B9309?OpenDocument), accessed on January 27, 2011.

cut deployed arsenals to 1,550 warheads each—has germinated optimism in favor of nuclear disarmament.¹⁸ In theory, it is an arms control arrangement instead of disarmament agreement. The significant objective of the Treaty is spelled out in the Text of Treaty and in its Protocol. A few of them are: Article II, Clause 1 of the new START states: Each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber nuclear armaments, so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate numbers, as counted in accordance with Article III of this Treaty, do not exceed:

- (a) 700, for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers;
- (b) 1550, for warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers;
- (c) 800, for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.

The treaty permits each party to determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms and the Treaty shall remain in force for 10 years unless it is superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. The New START would reduce thirty percent of active strategic

nuclear weapons on each side. The notable fact in this Treaty is that neither party would have to actually eliminate large numbers of weapons to meet the new limits. The Treaty does not apply to whole categories of weapons, including thousands of strategic warheads held in reserve and tactical warheads, some of which are still stationed in Europe. Indeed the 30 percent reduction of the American and Russian active strategic nuclear weapons would have little impact on their nuclear postures, yet it would be a constructive Treaty in the realm of nuclear arms-control.

Importantly, the New START would not cap the research and development intended to develop more sophisticated nuclear weapons in the future. That is why the Obama Administration has approached the Congress for nearly \$85 billion budget for the modernization of its existing nuclear arsenals.¹⁹ The Obama Administration's robust, \$85 billion, 10-year plan for upgrading the nuclear weapons are one of the largest increases in nuclear warhead spending in US history. According to Zia Mian's estimate, "the Los Alamos National Laboratory will see a 22 percent increase in its budget, said to be the largest one-year jump since 1944. The flagship project is the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility, which could produce 125 plutonium pits per year and as many as 200 pits a year. This annual production capacity is roughly equivalent to the total arsenal of Britain (less than 200 weapons) or a large fraction of the arsenals of China (250 weapons) or France (less than 300 weapons).²⁰

18. Daryl G. Kimball, "After New START, What Next?" Arms Control Today, January/February 2011.

19. Ibid.

20. Zia Mian, "Obama's Nuclear Postures," Middle East Report on line, July 5, 2010.

UNSC Resolution 1887: lacks practical approach towards nuclear disarmament

President Obama chaired a historic 6191st meeting of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) on September 24, 2009. The 14 Heads of State, Government present UNSC meeting unanimously adopted Resolution 1887 (2009). The resolution called for stepping-up efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, promote disarmament and “reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism”. It called for better security for nuclear weapons materials and underscored the Security Council’s intention to take action if such material or nuclear weapons gets into the hands of terrorists. President Obama stated: “I called for this (Summit), so that we may address at the highest level a fundamental threat to the security of all people and all nations — the spread and use of nuclear weapons.” He added: “This very institution was founded at the dawn of the atomic age, in part because man’s capacity to kill had to be contained, and although we averted a nuclear nightmare during the Cold War, we now face proliferation of a scope and complexity that demands new strategies and new approaches.” Ironically, since the very beginning of the nuclear age several American Presidents have been expressing their serious concerns about the nuclear proliferation danger, without any practical program for their own nuclear arsenals abolition.

Instead of making concrete commitments to nuclear disarmament and laying out practical steps towards this goal in compliance with their legal obligations under the Article VI of the NPT, the nuclear weapon states used the Summit to lay out their vision for stricter requirements for non-nuclear weapon states to prove that they are not seeking

or do not acquire nuclear weapons in future. For instance, the French and British leaders highlighted the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs repercussion in the UNSC meeting. President Nicolas Sarkozy and Prime Minister Gordon Brown firmly demanded that Iran should comply instantly with the UNSC resolutions. President Sarkozy accused Iran and North Korea of undermining the very rules upon which collective security was based. He added: “in violation of five Security Council resolutions, Iran had been pursuing nuclear proliferation activities since 2005. This statements manifested nuclear weapon states monopolistic mindset and also accredited nuclear weapons significance in the strategic environment of the global politics.

The UNSC Resolution 1887 (2009) also called on states not party to the NPT to join it. There are only three countries outside the NPT —India, Pakistan and Israel. Among these three states, the target state is Pakistan. India’s nuclear weapon program was indirectly legitimized by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the United States in October 2008. Nonetheless, India ruled out signing the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state. On September 24, 2009, it reiterated its historical stance on the NPT and categorically stated that ‘it cannot support a discriminatory’ pact. Moreover, for India the NPT has no attraction after the Indo-US nuclear deal and India-specific amendments in the Nuclear Supplier Group. If India remains opposed to NPT, Pakistan would definitely uphold its position on the NPT.

Israel’s nuclear weapons program has been overlooked by the United States and other Western powers. These powers have directly and indirectly assisted the

advancement of Israel's nuclear weapons capabilities instead of pressuring it to join the NPT. This preferential treatment of Israel disturbs the Arab and Middle Eastern states. Libya's UN ambassador, Abdurrahman Mohamed Shalgam, demanded in the UNSC meeting that Israel's nuclear sites should be subject to international oversight. He added: "otherwise, all the states of the Middle East will say, we have a right to develop nuclear weapons. Why Israel alone?" More precisely, the UNSC Resolution 1887 (2009) was a mere rhetorical act or an empty promise, because the nuclear weapon states were not convinced for universal nuclear disarmament. President Obama and his like-minded heads of state and government expressed a strong desire for a world without nuclear weapons, without addressing the chronic deficiency of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The pivotal component of the regime, NPT has failed to lead the world towards denuclearization due to the nuclear weapons states non-compliance policies. President of Costa Rica, Óscar Arias Sanchez correctly pointed out in September 2009: "It did not seem plausible to discuss disarmament as long as existing agreements were not even being honored." Hence the pragmatic approach towards nuclear disarmament is the implementation of the Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

A treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices

During the recent years the initiative to constitute a treaty banning the

production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT) received an immense support. The shift in Washington's position on the FMCT germinated an impression that negotiations on the treaty draft formation were possible. President Obama in his Prague speech on April 5, 2009, declared the need for a treaty that "verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in state nuclear weapons."²¹ President Obama's statement reversed the Bush administration's position first stated in 2004 that an FMCT could not be effectively verified. This resolved the 'verification issue' but failed to address the puzzle of 'preexisting stocks'. Nevertheless, the CD adopted a program of work enabling it to begin negotiations of a 'non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices' on May 29, 2009.

The agreement on program of work ended 12 years deadlock in the CD.²² Unfortunately, the members of the CD were unable to implement this program of work and the procedural stalemate continued to-date. It is because the CD members are unable to develop a consensus on the scope of the treaty. The difference between the States in favor of including existing stocks into the scope [call for a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT)] and the States favoring only a ban in production [call for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)].

The FMCT received substantial support in the UNSC Resolution 1887,

21. Ellen O. Tauscher, "Obama's Commitment," eJournal, Vol. 15, No. 2, February 2010, p. 5. See also Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered.
22. Cole Harvey, "CD Breaks Deadlock on Work Plan", Arms Control Today, June 2009, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_6/CD. Accessed on April 26, 2010.

which “calls upon the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate a Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices as soon as possible.”²³ Subsequently, on October 29, 2009, for the first time since 2004, the First Committee of the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution without a vote on a treaty specifically banning the production of materials for use in nuclear weapons.²⁴ The consensus action plan adopted by the 2010 NPT Review Conference also made direct reference to the FMCT. It stated: “All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced program of work, immediately begin negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein.”²⁵ Despite these supportive overtures, the members failed to develop a consensus on FMCT.

PAKISTAN’S OPPOSITION TO FMCT

The negotiating climate was clouded on the subject of FMCT due to the firm opposition of an active CD member Pakistan. At the UNGA First Committee in 2010, Pakistan was the only country to oppose the resolution calling for the negotiation of FMCT in the CD during 2011. On December 14, 2010, the highest

decision making body on strategic issues in Pakistan, the National Command Authority (NCA), chaired by the Prime Minister, expressed its serious concern over the policies and trends of selectivity, exceptionalism and discrimination relating to strategic export control regimes. The NCA categorically stated: “Such policies, detrimental as they are to international peace and security, undermine the credibility of the existing non-proliferation regime and are inconsistent with the national laws and international obligations. Revisionism based on strategic, political or commercial considerations accentuates asymmetries and would perpetuate instability, especially in South Asia.”²⁶

Islamabad could not underplay the regional strategic environment in its nuclear nonproliferation outlook. In addition, it considers an FMCT as an arms control arrangement. Philosophically speaking, arms control arrangements preserve the persisting status quo. The status quo is always in the interest of the advantageous nations in the global politics. In the South Asian context, India is in an advantageous position due to its cementing strategic partnership with the United States. In 2008, for its own strategic and commercial reasons, the United States persuaded the NSG to exempt India from the comprehensive safeguards standard.²⁷ Consequently, the NSG in 2008 exempted India from its comprehensive safeguards requirement.

23 Resolution 1887 (2009) Adopted by the Security Council at its 6191st meeting, on September 24, 2009. <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/523/74/PDF/N0952374.pdf?OpenElement>. Accessed on May 13, 2010.

24 The resolution (A/C.1/64/L.1/Rev.1) was adopted without a vote and was entitled “Treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”

25. 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF.2010/MC.I/WP.1, New York, May 24, 2010, pp. 5-6.

26. “NCA Meeting.” Inter Services Public Relations - Press Release - No 11/2010-ISPR. Rawalpindi - December 14, 2010. http://www.ispr.gov.pk/front/main.asp?o=t-press_release&date=2010/12/14.

27. Fred McGoldrick, “The Road Ahead for Export Controls: Challenges for the Nuclear Suppliers Group,” *Arms Control Today*, January/February 2011.

The South Asian strategic environment has not been properly taken into account in the CD deliberations. It seems that majority of the CD members have been deliberately ignoring the drastic strategic destabilizing developments in South Asia. The United States and India's cementing cooperation in high-politics and the former's support to the latter's military muscle buildup and Great Power stature to cope with the rise of Chinese power has serious strategic repercussions for Pakistan.²⁸ On January 25, 2011, Ambassador Zamir Akram, permanent representative of Pakistan at CD pointed out: "Over the last two years, Pakistan has clearly stated that it cannot agree to negotiations on a FMCT in the CD owing to the discriminatory waiver provided by the NSG to our neighbor for nuclear cooperation by several major powers, as this arrangement will further accentuate the asymmetry in fissile materials stock-piles in the region, to the detriment of Pakistan's security interests." He added: "As we have also pointed out earlier, Pakistan has been compelled to take this position due to the selective and discriminatory action of certain states in violation of their own national and international commitments, in pursuit of profit and outdated Cold War concepts of containment and balance of power."²⁹

Destabilizing trends in Global Politics

The developments in the global politics have directly impacted on the CD agenda. It is because the CD does not operate in a vacuum and thereby, its work is directly affected by developments in

the international political system. More precisely, any state's arms procurement or development, introduction of a new generation of weapon, arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation at the regional and the global level has a direct impact on the CD agenda. Since November 2010, the Obama Administration has been supporting India's full membership in four multilateral export control regimes, namely the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Australia Group (AG), and the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA). The support for India's full membership in these regime manifests that commercial ventures have more significance than encouraging arms control and disarmament. Recently, after more than a decade of sanctions, the United States has ended export restrictions on India's defense and space industries. The blacklisted Indian organizations, including the Defence Research and Development organization, which develops weapons, have been cleared.

The NSG, MTCR, AG, and WA are significant components of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and impede both vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. Although, these institutions have been gradually losing their credibility and relevance in the context of international non-proliferation, yet they are relevant in the transfer of dual-use technology. These institutions obstruct the transfer of dual-use technology to Pakistan. This technology-denial approach has severe repercussions for

28. For details about India-US strategic partnership to counter China see Ashley J. Tellis, "Obama in India Building a Global Partnership: Challenges, Risks, Opportunities," Policy Outlook, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 28, 2010.

29. Statement by Ambassador Zamir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the UN and other International Organizations at the Conference on Disarmament, Pakistan Permanent Mission to the United Nations, Geneva, January 25, 2011, p. 1.

Pakistan's industrial development and economic progress. In the South Asian context, this kind of marginalization policy is very much state specific and lacks universal criteria. Moreover, once India would become a member of these institutions, the imbalance within the region would be further intensified.

India's progressive integration into all the institutions charged with oversight of the global regime would have regional and international ramifications. This arrangement would not only contribute politically in India's stature in the global politics, but also practically provide opportunities to the Indian nuclear, space and other strategic organizations to do trade with the members of these organizations without any restrictions. It would enhance India's nuclear and missile capabilities. The growing capability of India's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile defense would unleash destabilizing nuclear arms race in the region.

Conventional Arms Race

The conventional arms control is imperative for the nuclear confidence building measures entailing nuclear arms control. This established as well as tested route has been missing in the current debate in CD. The proponents of the current CD agenda have been deliberately ignoring the inevitable link between the conventional and nuclear arms control. Particularly, in a region in which conventional asymmetry between the belligerent neighbors has been widening and also severely taxing one state's resources. The disadvantageous state in the conventional arms balance of power has the only practical option to prevent the advantageous state aggression through its nuclear weapons capability. Therefore, Islamabad has

articulated its comprehensive approach towards a regional restraint regime, which is based on three points: nuclear restraint in the light of Pakistan-India situation, conventional imbalances should be corrected and disputes, including that on Kashmir, should be resolved so that the risk of arms race could be minimized.

Negotiating FMCT outside the CD

The protracted stalemate on the FMCT negotiations in the CD has frustrated many proponents of the Treaty. They have been spelling out different strategies for accomplishing their objective. Some of them have been citing the entry into force of the Convention on Cluster Munitions as an example for the fissile material treaty. They believed that the formation of the cluster munitions convention outside the CD provided "grounds for inspiration" for the negotiations on an FMCT. They failed to realize that except five declared nuclear weapon states under the NPT (China, France, Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom) and the four countries currently outside of the NPT (India, Israel, North Korea and Pakistan), all other states have already committed not to produce fissile material for weapons and are under verification requirements by the IAEA or have been observing comprehensive safeguards of the Agency. Hence, keeping any one of these nine states, especially from four non-party of the NPT, out of the fissile material cut-off negotiations, the treaty would be of little value.

The prevention of an arms race to outer space

The great powers' space programs signify an intensification of space-militarization as well as space-weaponization in

the future. The United States is engaged in developing a space-based interceptor for its missile defense system. In addition, the Russian Federation, China and European states have all maintained research and development on re-entry technologies relevant to potential orbital bombardment systems. Great powers' space weapon programs are likely to instigate regional strategic competitors, such as Israel, Iran, India, Pakistan, etc. The Indian Air Force has been seriously pursuing space expertise and it has already recommended New Delhi to set up a Strategic Aerospace Command to develop military space capabilities.³⁰ Deploying weapons in space brings about a serious threat having global repercussions and censure to an arms control approach in the international relations, despite its philosophical rationale. This emerging trend in strategic competition could convert Space into a surrogate battlefield. More precisely, the use of space for both missile defense and anti-satellite (ASAT) purposes would spark a new spiral arms race that appears to be economically and technologically challenging, strategically destabilizing, and environmentally exacerbating radiation and debris threats in low-Earth orbit.

PAROS: Rejected by US and Israel

In 1981, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution that states refrain from actions contrary to the peaceful use of Outer Space, calling for negotiations within the CD on a multilateral agreement on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). Under this item considerable attention was devoted to confidence

building, which could promote transparency and predictability in the space activities of states. A code of conduct (also called 'rules of the road') in space was proposed, containing a formal renunciation of all actions that might interfere with the operation of space objects, whether civilian or military.³¹ Notably, in the beginning the voting patterns demonstrated nearly unanimous support for the PAROS resolution, suggesting a consistent and widespread desire on the part of states to expand international law to include prohibitions on weapons in space. However, the US had consistently abstained from voting on the resolution since 1995. In 2005 the United States and Israel voted against PAROS in the Conference on Disarmament.³² The US and Israel opposition to PAROS manifested that both states were having space weapon programs.

US: Space Weapons developments

Since 2005, the US refusal to debate the issue of the non-weaponisation of space in bilateral or multilateral forums indicates that it has been considering using the space for military applications, including stationing weapons in space and attacking objects in space. Washington has increased its investment in the research and development in the realm of space weapons for the continuation of its military primacy in the international politics. On October 6, 2006 the White House released an unclassified version of the US National Space Policy (NSP). It contained a new US approach to both military and civil operations in space.³³ The NSP rejected any limitations on the fundamental right

30. "Executive Summary," Space Security, July 2006, p. 16.

31. Ibid, 171.

32. "Executive Summary," Space Security, July 2006, pp. 14-15.

33. The preliminary space power writings in the United States have centered on space as a logical extension of air power theory, such treatment is akin to early Army characterizations of aircraft as tools of the artillery or signal corps, restricted to supporting ground operations. Martin E. B. France, "Back to the future: space power theory and A. T. Mahan," Space Policy, Vol. 16, No. 4, November 2000, p. 237.

of the US to conduct operations in space. It stated that Washington would oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit US access to or use of space. It also promised that the US would not only preserve its own freedom of action in space but would, if necessary, deny adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to US national interest.³⁴ Moreover, it stated that the proposed arms control agreements or restrictions must not impair the rights of the US to conduct research, development, testing, and operations or other activities in space for US national interests.³⁵ On June 28, 2007 the members of US Congress missile-defense caucus, in their mission statement, emphasized the importance of a rigorous US missile defense plan to counter the growing arsenal of faster, longer-range and more sophisticated ballistic missiles of the US strategic military rivals. They argued that their enemies and rivals were exploring space-based technologies to gain a strategic military advantage over the United States.³⁶ In 2007, the Pentagon had announced its intention to pursue a test-bed for space-based missile defenses.³⁷ The test-bed deployment would entail putting one or more missile-targeting interceptor satellites into orbit.

The Obama Administration announced its new US National Space Policy in June 2010. It reflects a departure from

the 2006 NSP in the sphere of the prevention of the arms race in space. According to it the US would consider space-related arms control concepts, and proposals that meet the criteria of equality and effective verifiability, and which enhance the national security of the United States and its allies. The US continues to support the inclusion of a non-negotiating, or discussion, mandate in any CD program of work under the Agenda item PAROS.³⁸ The language in this new policy suggests that this is a significant departure from its predecessor. However, the actual implications of this change are still unknown. The US has also changed its position at the UN General Assembly, where it no longer votes against the annual resolution on PAROS but rather chose to abstain together with Israel. All other countries voted in favor.

China's ASAT

China demonstrated the operability of its ASAT on January 11, 2007, by blowing up one of its own obsolete weather satellite—the Feng Yun 1C (FY-1C) with an anti-satellite rocket.³⁹ Russia has also approved a new Federal Space Program with the stated objective of retaining status as a leading space power. Many strategic analysts opine that the Chinese launch would spark an ASAT arms race. It was reported that Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom are expected to follow China.⁴⁰ In addition, the European Union

34. "The New US Space Policy," *Military Technology*, Vol. xxx, Issue 12, 2006, p.38.

35. *Ibid.*

36. Tara Copp, "US Congressional caucus fight for European missile shield," *Jane's International Defence Review*, Vol. 40, August 2007, p. 5.

37. The Bush administration requested \$10 million in funding in fiscal year 2008 (FY08) for a Space Test Bed as part of its effort to develop a space-based missile defense system..

38. Remarks of Rose Frank A, Rose, Conference on Disarmament, July 13, 2010. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/public_html/political/cd/2010/statements/part2/13July_Frank_A_Rose.pdf, accessed on January 31, 2011.

39. Duncan Lennox, "More details emerge of Chinese ASAT technology," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 44, Issue 5, January 31, 2007, p. 5. "A new arms race in space?," *Economist*, January 27, 2007, Vol. 382 Issue 8513, pp. 10-11. <http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail?vid=1&hid=21&sid=4809ebf2-e195-4d3d-8b50-50356-a73a181%40sessionmgr7>. Accessed on August 2, 2007.

40. Caitlin Harrington, "Chinese ASAT test rekindles weapons debate," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol. 44, Issue 4, January 24, 2007, p. 4.

member states are openly talking about using common civilian space assets for military purposes.⁴¹

Washington's increased interest in developing anti-ballistic missile defenses in the late 1990s stimulated Chinese and Russian demands for a new space agreement to limit the US missile defense systems. Valery Loshchinin, the Russian Federation representative in the CD stated: "Both the United States and Russian legislatures had entered conditions in their ratifications, but it was a compromise. Russia could leave the treaty (START) if the United States were to unilaterally deploy anti-missile systems which infringed the defensibility of Russia."

Negative Security Assurances

The most effective guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament under effective international controls. In the absence of nuclear disarmament, the negative security assurances are an indispensable measure against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.⁴² The states which have forsworn nuclear weapons under the NPT have demanded formal assurances that nuclear weapons would not be used against them. The negative security assurances (NSAs)—the pledges by NPT nuclear-weapon states not to use nuclear weapons against NPT non-nuclear-weapon

states unless attacked by such a state in alliance with a nuclear-weapon state. The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 21/53A (1966) stated: "Nuclear weapons powers should give an assurance that they will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states without nuclear weapons on their territories."⁴³ In response to the UNGA Resolution 21/53A, the former Soviet Union proposed a treaty to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States parties to the treaty which have no nuclear weapons on their territory. The Russian proposal was rejected by Washington, because it concluded that this treaty would have enabled the former USSR to threaten NATO members in Western Europe who had American weapons on their territory.

The NSAs constitute a link in the chain of measures forming the non-proliferation regime. During the NPT negotiations, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) states sought negative security assurances from the nuclear-weapon states, arguing that after all, if the non-nuclear-weapon states were to forswear nuclear weapons, the least the nuclear weapons states could agree to was not to threaten or use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states.⁴⁴ In August 1968 (just after the signing of the NPT), the conference of non-nuclear-weapon States, convened

41. A November 2004 EU Council document on European Space Policy discusses the possibility in the long term of launching military space programs supported or possibly managed by the European Defence Agency on behalf of the member states. Theresa Hitchens and Tomas Valasek, "The security dimension of European collective efforts in space," SIPRI Yearbook 2006: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 567.

42. For understanding the positive and negative security assurances see Jozef Goldblat, *Arms Control: The New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements* (London: Sage Publications, 2002), pp.109-113.

43. Thomas Graham and Leonor Tomero, "Obligations For Us All: NATO & Negative Security Assurances," *Disarmament Diplomacy*, Issue No. 49, August 2000. <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd49/49nato.htm>, accessed on March 7, 2011.

44. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 21/53A (1966).

45. Thomas Graham and Leonor Tomero, "Obligations For Us All: NATO & Negative Security Assurances," *Disarmament Diplomacy*, Issue No. 49, August 2000. <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd49/49nato.htm>, accessed on March 7, 2011.

at the initiative of Pakistan discussed the issue of NSAs but failed to reach agreement.⁴⁶ Only 27 years later just before the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution 984 concerning the NSA.

Presently, the only assurances that exist are not legally-binding, such as unilateral declarations contained within nuclear weapon free zone treaty protocols (Latin America, South Pacific, Southeast Asia, Africa, Central Asia and Mongolia) and in the Security Council Resolution 984 (1995), i.e. S/1995/261, S/1995/262, S/1995/263, S/1995/264, S/1995/265, are unilateral declarations of negative security assurances from each of the five NWS to members of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). These assurances are not legally binding, and do not apply in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the NWS, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a State towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained by such a NNWS in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.⁴⁷ Jozef Goldblat pointed out that: “The United States, the United Kingdom, France and Russia made it clear that their assurances would cease to be valid in case of an attack on them or their allies, carried out or sustained in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State. In other words, the four powers feel free to resort to nuclear weapons, whenever they decide that the conditions for use, which

they had formulated, have been met.”⁴⁸

The United States has maintained an ambiguous stance on the NSAs in the previous years. It perceived that it was against its National Security Strategy. For instance, the US threatened nuclear retaliation in the event of a nuclear, biological or chemical weapon attack on its soil in the 1990s. In December 1997 President Clinton issued Presidential Directive (PDD) 60 which may preserve the option of US retaliation with nuclear weapons against an attack involving chemical or biological weapons.⁴⁹ The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review maintained the possibility that the US nuclear forces could be used against non-nuclear nations. In February 2002, then-State Department spokesman Richard Boucher said it was US policy that “if a weapon of mass destruction is used against the United States or its allies, we will not rule out any specific type of military response.”⁵⁰ Nevertheless, the Obama Administration has changed its strategy. In the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), it declared that it would not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states that are members in good standing of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The 2010 NPR states that the United States “will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.”⁵¹

46. Jozef Goldblat, “Negative Security Assurances or a Global Ban on Use?” paper presented in seminar held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on August 8, 2006, Conference on Disarmament, CD/1804, October 25, 2006, p. 4. <http://www.unidir.org/pdf/activites/pdf2-act327.pdf>, accessed on March 8, 2011.

47. Fact Sheet: Negative Security Assurances,” Global Security Institute, <http://www.gs institute.org/dpe/docs/Fact-SheetNSAs.pdf>, accessed on March 7, 2011.

48. Jozef Goldblat, “Negative Security Assurances or a Global Ban on Use?” paper presented in seminar held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on August 8, 2006, Conference on Disarmament, CD/1804, October 25, 2006, p. 4. <http://www.unidir.org/pdf/activites/pdf2-act327.pdf>, accessed on March 8, 2011.

49. Thomas Graham and Leonor Tomero, “Obligations For Us All: NATO & Negative Security Assurances,” Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 49, August 2000. <http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd49/49nato.htm>, accessed on March 7, 2011.

50. “U.S. ‘Negative Security Assurances’ At a Glance,” Arms Control Today, <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/negsec>, accessed on March 7, 2011.

51. Nuclear Posture Review Report, U.S. Department of Defense, Washington, April 2010, p. 15.

The CD has a mandate to negotiate 'effective international arrangements' to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Though, it is on the permanent agenda of the CD, yet it remains deadlocked and no progress has been made. On October 26, 2010, the First Committee adopted draft resolution A/C.1/65/L.5, entitled "Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons," with a vote of 106 in favor, none against, 58 abstentions. This did not differ significantly from the voting in 2009 First Committee, where the same resolution was adopted with a vote of 119-0-58. The voting pattern of the five recognized nuclear weapon states was remained the same, i.e. China voted in favor and the others abstained. The Pakistani and Indian delegations voted in favor, while the Israeli delegation abstained. Last month, both India and Pakistan supported work on a multilateral and legally-binding agreement on negative security assurances. The latter has given its unconditional pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against states not possessing nuclear weapons. On February 10, 2011, Ambassador Akram stated at the CD: "We are ready to translate this pledge into a legally binding international instrument."

In reality, the prevailing NSAs are conditional, phrased in a different way by different countries, and merely declaratory. Hence, the CD members need to develop negative security assurances that would be uniform, unconditional, and legally binding. The negotiations at the CD should lead to a multilateral treaty containing an undertaking by the Parties never to use or threaten to use a nuclear weapon against non nuclear weapon states.

Conclusion

The CD Agenda in 2011 has been victim of real politick and gradual erosion of international non-proliferation regime's norms in the global politics. One fails to understand, why the stalled progress on one subject—FMCT—is viewed as a detrimental for the very existence or usefulness of the CD. The 65-nations body should focus on those issues on which the members have consensus, such as nuclear disarmament. To conclude, the principles of universality, significance of prevailing regional and international security trends should be the guiding principles in developing consensus on the CD Agenda in 2011. Indeed the favored-state-criterion or bulldozing tactic should not be opted to engineer a consensus in the Conference on Disarmament.

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